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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE FALSE ALARM OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION
NO. 1784 V. STOTTS
INTRODUCTION
Employers often institute voluntary affirmative action programs
in order to avoid or discontinue title VIII employment discrimina-
tion litigation.2 Delineated in negotiated consent decrees,3 these
programs normally include plans for the hiring and promotion of
minorities. 4 Layoffs in accordance with an established seniority sys-
tem, however, can radically undermine the effectiveness of affirma-
tive action plans. Because minority workers are typically among the
most recently hired, they are also among the first to be fired.
In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts 5 the Supreme Court
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII forbids employers, including
state and local governments and government agencies, from discriminating on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the hiring or discharge of employees, or
with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Id.
§ 2000e-2(a). If an employer engages in any "unlawful employment practice," a court
may enjoin the practice and may order "such affirmative action as may be appropriate,"
including hiring, reinstatement, or "any other equitable relief." Id. § 2000e-5(g).
For a further discussion of the protections title VII affords, see infra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text; Jacobs, A Constitutional Route to Discriminatory Impact Statutoiy Liability
for State and Local Government Employers: All Roads Lead to Rome, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 301
(1980) (title VII cannot prohibit unintentional discrimination under the fourteenth
amendment but may do so under the commerce clause); Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima
Fade Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REV. 181 (1981) (discussing theories a plaintiff can use to prove unlawful
discrimination).
2 In 1980, litigants filed 5,017 employment discrimination cases in district courts.
C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURT A-1 (1982).
"IT]he most persuasive reason for employers to back affirmative action plans is to
avoid expensive. . . lawsuits." Such suits can cost "hundreds of thousands of dollars."
Address by San Francisco attorney Gary Siniscalco to the Conference on Affirmative
Action, reported in 3 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) 367 (1985).
3 For examples of consent decrees containing voluntary affirmative action plans,
see Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct.
3579 (1984); Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. NewJersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 588 F. Supp. 716
(D.N.J.), vacated, 588 F. Supp. 732 (D.NJ. 1984); infra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text. Consent decrees may also be entered voluntarily in order to achieve other pur-
poses, including the promotion of ethnic diversity in the labor force. See, e.g., Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985) (affirmative action agreement adopted to achieve multi-ethnic representation on
the teaching faculty).
4 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
5 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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addressed several issues related to the judicial interpretation and
modification of an affirmative action consent decree. The Court
concluded that a court may not modify an affirmative action plan,
silent on the issue of layoffs, to override a bona fide seniority sys-
tem6 when work force reductions occur.
7
The Stotts Court raised issues in addition to the proper judicial
treatment of consent decrees in the face of layoffs. Stotts sparked
inquiries into whether court-imposed quotas are valid and whether a
title VII plaintiff must prove that he has been an actual victim of
discrimination.8 The Court also initiated speculation concerning
whether parties can voluntarily agree to class-wide affirmative action
relief, including grants of constructive seniority.9 Some observers,
however, have questioned the extent to which Stotts affected title VII
at all.' 0
Within days of its announcement, Stotts received enormous pub-
licity. Called "a source of greatest comment-and confusion,""
and "the most highly charged case involving alleged discrimination
against whites to reach the Court in several years,"' 2 the decision
generated a spectrum of public reaction and debate regarding its
meaning and scope. Some observers, including the Justice Depart-
ment, considered Stotts the death knell of affirmative action.' 3 Assis-
tant Attorney General Reynolds claimed that the decision extended
beyond mere protection of seniority systems, asserting that Stotts in-
validated any court-imposed employment program giving minorities
preferential treatment. 14 Other commentators maintained that the
6 For a discussion of bona fide seniority systems, see sources cited infra note 84.
7 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
8 See infra notes 13-14, 54-57 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 15, 63-90 and accompanying text.
11 Much Ado About a Shift to the Right, TIME, June 25, 1984, at 73.
12 N.Y. Times, June 13, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
13 The Justice Department hailed the decision as vindicating its position that the
courts could not award minorities preferential treatment except to compensate actual
victims of illegal discrimination. Pear, Judges Continuing to Uphold Quotas, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
In addition, the Reagan administration "has argued that [Stotts] also struck down
[all] preferential quotas in hiring and promotion," even those voluntarily adopted. She-
non, U.S. Acts to Stop Quotas on Hiring in Indianapolis, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1985, § 1, at 1,
col. 6.
14 2 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) 739 (1984) (statement of William Bradford
Reynolds, Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights).
Just weeks after the decision, the Justice Department filed successful motions in
Ohio and New Jersey asking federal courts to overturn court orders issued to protect
affirmative action programs from the undermining effects of layoffs which were to be
carried out under established seniority system guidelines. Id. at 785. Further, the Jus-
tice Department "urged 50 states, counties and cities . . . to modify their affirmative
action plans voluntarily to remove numerical goals and quotas," threatening judicial ac-
tion if they did not comply. Shenon, supra note 13, at 1, col. 6. The United States Coin-
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decision was limited in scope, applying only to cases involving lay-
offs and the resulting conflicts between affirmative action programs
and seniority systems.' 5
This Note argues that the narrowness of the Court's holding 16
and the facts and circumstances surrounding the Stotts consent de-
cree' 7 limit the decision's scope. Accordingly, minorities claiming
employment discrimination can avoid Stotts-constructed obstacles'
through carefully drafted consent decrees' 8 and through the use of
different litigation strategies.' 9 Thus, the practical effects of the de-
cision on title VII and affirmative action will be minimal.
I
THE HISTORY OF STOTTS
A. The Lower Court Decisions
In 1977, Carl Stotts, a black captain in the Memphis Fire De-
partment, filed a class action suit in federal district court,20 claiming
mission on Civil Rights, over the dissent of two democratic commissioners, praised Stotts
as a reaffirmation of the principle that race and gender are not proper bases on which to
reward or penalize any person. 2 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) at 783. On a more
restrained note, the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re-
marked to a United States House of Representatives panel that the "ambiguous" deci-
sion does not close the affirmative action door, but rather signals that the Court is
"deeply troubled about the validity of affirmative action where there has been no prior
finding of discrimination." Id. at 973.
15 A Women's Legal Defense Fund attorney explained that Stotts will only affect an
affirmative action plan that conflicts with a bona fide seniority system. 2 EMPLOYEE REL.
WEEKLY (BNA) at 739. Similarly, William D. Taylor, Director of the Center for National
Policy Review at Catholic University of America, asserted that Stotts " 'doesn't affect the
broad spectrum of affirmative action in the country. In most cases, you can assume that
people hired will not be laid off.'" N.Y. Times,June 13, 1984, at B-12, col. 4. Likewise,
Duke University Law Professor William Van Alstyne explained that Stotts was "'quite a
narrow decision,'" applying only in situations involving legitimate seniority systems.
Much Ado About a Shift to the Right, supra note 11, at 63.
Civil rights attorneys predicted that even though affirmative action plans remain
valid after Stotts, employers will negotiate fewer plans in the future. 2 EMPLOYEE REL.
WEEKLY (BNA) at 740. Advocates of this view reasoned that because of potentially
greater burdens of proof on title VII litigants, see infra notes 54-57 and accompanying
text, courts would have less power to fashion broad affirmative action remedies. Conse-
quently, employers might be less willing to voluntarily agree to plans that courts may
not even be able to require. Because of this, the ruling would result in a mass of litiga-
tion. Proponents of this view noted that the litigation would be extensive because indi-
viduals would need to establish exactly who was a "victim" of the alleged discriminatory
practice. 2 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) at 740 (1984). Finally, minorities would be
forced to litigate to create a record of "hard findings" of illegal discrimination in order
for certain remedies to apply. Id.
16 See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 91-124 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
20 The action was brought under title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), and under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). The district court consolidated Stotts's class action
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that the Fire Department and the city discriminated racially in their
hiring and promotion practices. After three years of discovery and
negotiations, the parties entered into a consent decree, 21 which the
district court approved on April 25, 1980.22 The parties negotiated
the decree "to avoid the delay and expense of contested litigation"
and "to insure that any disadvantage to minorities that may have
resulted from past hiring and promotional practices be reme-
died."' 23 The parties waived a hearing, findings of fact, and conclu-
sions of law on every issue raised in the complaint. 24 Further, the
Fire Department did not admit any "violations of law, rule, or regu-
lation with respect to the allegations" Stotts made in his
complaint. 25
The parties intended the decree to "parallel and supplement
the relief provided" in a 1974 affirmative action consent decree.26
The earlier decree did not mention layoffs, expressly presuming that
the existing seniority system would continue. 27 Although the 1980
decree provided specific relief in the areas of hiring,28 promo-
tions,29 and back pay, 30 it also made no provisions for altering the
city's seniority system in the event of layoffs or for awarding retroac-
with an action brought by Fred Jones, a black private in the Memphis Fire Department.
Jones claimed "that the Fire Department had denied him a promotion solely because of
his race." Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 1982).
21 679 F.2d at 573-78 (appendix).
22 Id. at 548.
23 Id. at 573-74.
24 Id. at 574.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 548. The 1974 decree "affected employment practices in all divisions of
the Memphis city government." Id. at 546. In the 1974 decree, the city had not admit-
ted to any misconduct. Id. at 547.
27 Although the 1974 decree "committed the City to 'making significant progress in
increasing the number of black and female supervisory personnel,' " id. at 547, and the
city "agreed to undertake the 'goal of achieving throughout the work force proportions
of minority and female employees in each job classification approximating their respec-
tive proportions' " in the labor force, id, the decree specifically stated that seniority
would be computed for "purposes of promotion, transfer and assignment . . . as the
total seniority of that person with the city." Id. at 572. See also id. at 549 (city's seniority
system "mentioned in . . .1974 Decree").
28 The Consent Decree provided that "[t]he City shall, in meeting the long term
goal for black employees, establish and attempt to meet an interim goal, in entry level
classifications where the long term goal has not been met, of filling on an annual basis at
least 50% of all vacancies with qualified black applicants." Id. at 576 (quoting 1980
Consent Decree at V(7)).
29 The city agreed to promote "[b]lack applicants to positions above the rank of
private or other entry level job classification in proportion to their representation in the
qualified applicant pool for each uniformed-rank or civil service classification" or "at
least 20% for each [rank] as measured on an annual basis." Id. (quoting 1980 Consent
Decree at V (8)).
30 The parties agreed to an award of $60,000 as back pay. Id. (citing 1980 Consent
Decree at VI (10)).
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tive seniority to minority workers hired under the affirmative action
plan. 3'
In May, 1981, prompted by a deficit in the city's projected oper-
ating budget, Memphis officials announced their intention to lay off
workers in accordance with the existing seniority system.32 Con-
cerned about the effect of the layoffs on the affirmative action
plan,3 3 Stotts obtained a temporary restraining order, preventing
the city from "laying off or reducing in rank any minority employee
in the Memphis Fire Department." 34 Subsequently, the district
court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the city from ap-
plying its layoff system "insofar as it would decrease the percentage
of black[s]. . . employed in [specific positions] in the Memphis Fire
Department." 35
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding, but rejected the lower court's rationale. The Sixth
Circuit explained that "[t]he district court erred in ruling that the
seniority system was non-bona fide" because the trial court specifi-
cally found that "the layoff policy was not adopted with a discrimina-
tory purpose."3 6 The court concluded, however, that the district
court properly restrained the city from enacting its proposed layoff
scheme; the consent decree mandated an "increase in the level of
minority employment and promotion, ' 37 and the lower court had
the power to order specific performance of the terms of the de-
cree.38 The court also held that a consent decree may be modified
"upon a showing that the decree is void or is no longer equitable," 39
or on a showing that new conditions require the modification. 40
31 The consent decree made "no mention of layoffs or demotions ... nor is there
any suggestion of an intention to depart from the existing seniority system or from the
City's arrangements with the Union." 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
32 679 F.2d at 549. The announced layoffs were the first in the city's history. Id
33 "[N]early 60% of all firemen affected by [the city's plan of layoffs and reductions
in rank) would have been minorities. Moreover, 55% of all minority Lieutenants and
46% of all minority Drivers would either have been laid off or demoted if the announced
layoffs had occurred." Id. at 549-50. Further, it was "uncontroverted that the applica-
tion of the layoff policy . . .would have virtually destroyed the progress belatedly
achieved through affirmative action." Id. at 561.
34 Id. at 549.
35 Id. at 551. The injunction was modified on June 22, 1981, to include protection
for minorities in additional positions. The district court reasoned that the injunction
was appropriate because the proposed layoffs "would have a discriminatory impact and
[thus] the seniority system was non-bona fide." Id. at 551 (footnote omitted).
36 Id at 551 n.6.
37 Id. at 561.
38 Id. at 561-62.
39 Id. at 560.
40 Id. at 563.
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B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court
of appeals. 41 After finding that the controversy was not moot even
though the city had reinstated the employees, 42 the Court consid-
ered the case on its merits. Writing for the majority, Justice White
asserted that the central issue was whether the district court had the
power to issue an injunction "requiring white employees to be laid
off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system would have
called for the layoff of black employees with less seniority." 43 The
Court held that the lower courts had improperly modified the con-
sent decree.44 It based its holding on the notion that " 'a consent
decree must be discerned within its four comers, and not by refer-
ence to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to
it.' 45 Because the decree made "no mention of layoffs or demo-
tions," and because there was no suggestion that the parties in-
tended to alter the city's existing seniority system,46 the Court
refused to read such a provision into the decree. The majority ex-
plained that if the parties intended to alter the seniority system, it
would be "reasonable to believe that there would have been an ex-
press provision to that effect." '47
The Court also rejected the district court's reasoning that the
injunction was proper because it carried out the "purposes" of the
41 104 S. Ct. at 2581, 2583 (1984).
42 Id. at 2583-85. The Court concluded that the case was ripe because the injunc-
tion was never vacated and thus "must be complied with in connection with any future
layoffs." Id. at 2583. Further, the Court asserted that the lower court's decision to dis-
regard the city's seniority system in pursuit of the "mandated result" of the consent
decree was undisturbed, even if the injunction itself no longer applied. Id. Finally, be-
cause some non-minorities were laid off and some may have been demoted under the
modified plan, the availability of back pay for the month during which the layoffs were in
effect and the loss of seniority required judicial determination. The Court explained
that "[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, the
case is not moot notwithstanding the size of the dispute." Id. at 2584 (citation omitted).
43 Id. at 2585 (footnotes omitted).
44 Id. at 2590. ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined in Justice White's opinion.
45 Id. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82
(1971).
46 Id.
47 Id. The Court further expounded, "This is particularly true since the decree
stated that it was not 'intended to conflict with any provisions' of the 1974 decree. . .
and. . .the latter decree expressly anticipated that the City would recognize seniority."
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also emphasized the fact that the union and the non-
minority employees were not involved in the suit when the 1980 consent decree was
negotiated. Hence, they could not "be said to indicate any agreement" to the decree's
terms. Id Absent agreement to provisions "that might encroach on their rights, it
seems highly unlikely that the City would purport to bargain away non-minority rights
under the then-exisitng seniority system." Id. Thus, the district court could not justify
its action as mere enforcement of the agreement of the parties. Id.
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decree. 48 The decree provided for specific actions to remedy past
hiring and promotion practices,49 but it did not provide for the
award of constructive seniority.50 In rejecting the district court's
expansive interpretation of its power to modify consent decrees, the
Court stated that, absent an express provision to the contrary, it is
reasonable to believe that the decree "would not exceed the bounds
of the remedies that are appropriate under title VII."51 The Court
thereby reaffirmed title VII's specific protection of bona fide senior-
ity systems, explaining that absent proof of an intent to discrimi-
nate, section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed for the
routine application of a seniority system.52 Further, the majority ex-
plained that only when plaintiffs demonstrate that they actually have
been victims of a discriminatory practice may a court award con-
structive seniority.53
The Court then hinted that proof that one has been a victim of
discrimination is necessary for any title VII remedy.54 According to
the majority, title VII's legislative history does not authorize a court
"to give preferential treatment to non-victims." 55 It explained that
title VII does not permit the hiring, reinstatement, admission to
membership of, or payment of back pay to any person unless the
employer has discriminated against him in violation of the act.56
Likewise, although a court may enjoin an employer from further dis-
crimination and may require "the hiring or reinstatement of an em-
ployee," the majority asserted that " 'Title VII does not permit the
ordering of racial quotas.' -57
48 Id.
49 See supra notes 28-30.
50 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
51 Id. The Court explained that "appropriate" remedies specially protect seniority
systems under Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1982); see infra notes 52-53 & 83-85 and accompanying text.
52 104 S. Ct. at 2587; see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
53 104 S. Ct. at 2588. The Court reasoned that because there was no finding of
discrimination against specific individuals, the court of appeals "imposed . . .some-
thing that could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and the plaintiffs
proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed." Id.
54 Id- at 2589. The Court explained that granting constructive seniority only to
those who were actually victims of "illegal discrimination is consistent with the policy
behind § 706(g) of Title VII [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)], which affects the remedies
available in Title VII litigation." Id. at 2588-89 (footnote omitted). See also infra notes
55-57 and accompanying text.
55 Id. at 2589.
56 Id. at 2590 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14465 (1964), a sponsor-backed Senate
newsletter issued during an attempted filibuster of title VII).
57 Id- at 2589 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6566 (1964), a memorandum distributed by
House Republican sponsors discussing title VII's scope (emphasis added in Court's
opinion)).
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II
THE IMPACT OF STOTTS
Although the Stotts decision appears to have broad implica-
tions,58 the actual holding is quite narrow; it only affects a court's
power to interpret and modify a consent decree. 59 The decision can
be further limited because it involved a consent decree modification
that adversely affected a bona fide seniority system.60 Future parties
will be able to avoid the restrictions that Stotts imposes through the
use of voluntary affirmative action plans drafted to avoid the Stotts
decree's pitfalls.6 1 Finally, litigants who can show intentional dis-
crimination can avoid the restrictions and implications of Stotts by
bringing suit under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.62
A. The Narrow Holding: A Court's Power to Modify a
Consent Decree
The actual holding of Stotts is narrow, merely defining a court's
power to modify a voluntary affirmative action consent decree. 63
The Court first examined whether the consent decree contained en-
forceable provisions regarding constructive seniority.64 It deter-
mined that a consent decree must be interpreted " 'within its four
corners,' "65 asserting that the decree contained "no mention of lay-
offs or demotions . . . [nor] any suggestion of an intention to de-
part from the existing seniority system." 66 The majority explained
that a court cannot interpret a decree by referring to the purposes
of a party to the agreement, or by speculating on what the instru-
ment would have included had the case been litigated. 67 Because
the decree did not contain provisions indicating an intent to over-
ride the existing seniority system, the Court held that the lower
court's injunction was not justified.68 The Court further concluded
that the lower courts were powerless to modify the terms of the vol-
58 See supra notes 13-14, 54-57 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 91-124 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
63 The Court held: "We thus are unable to agree either that the order entered by the
District Court was a justifiable effort to enforce the terms of the [consent] decree. . . or
that it was a legitimate modification of the decree .... "104 S. Ct. at 2590 (emphasis
added).
64 Id. at 2586; see also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
65 104 S. Ct. at 2586 (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82
(1971)).
66 Id.
67 Id at 2586; see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
68 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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untary decree because a court must make findings of illegal discrimi-
nation before it can give any title VII relief.69 The Stotts consent
decree contained no such findings.70
The Court's discussion of title VII is dicta; the holding is lim-
ited to the judicial treatment of the consent decree. Justice Ste-
vens's andJustice O'Connor's separate concurring opinions support
this narrow reading of Stotts. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's
holding involves only "the administration of a consent decree," 7'
reasoning that if the consent decree-as a legally enforceable obli-
gation-had, by its terms, justified the lower court's injunction, then
the Court would have had to uphold the judgment "irrespective of
whether Title VII would authorize a similar injunction. 7 2 Thus,
"what govern[ed] this case [was] not Tite VII, but the consent de-
cree." 73 Justice O'Connor 74 stated that the lower court's action
would have been justified had it been "a reasonable interpretation
of the consent decree or. . . a permissible exercise of the District
Court's authority to modify that consent decree."' 75 Setting forth
the requirements for a valid court modification of a decree, she con-
cluded that the respondent had not met his burden and, as a result,
the modification was improper.7 6
Hence, the Stotts holding is narrow, only affecting the judicial
interpretation of an affirmative action consent decree. A court must
strictly construe and cannot judicially modify such an instrument ab-
sent findings of illegal discrimination. The court's entire discussion
of title VII and the act's implications on a court's authority in a liti-
gated title VII action is "wholly advisory." 77
69 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, concurring in the judg-
ment, further expounded that "the Court's discussion of Title VII is wholly advisory.
This case involves no issue under Title VII . Id.
72 Id. (footnote omitted).
73 Id. at 2595. In a subsequent case Justice Stevens further criticized the Court's
opinion in Stotts, saying that "the Court should abjure the practice of reaching out to
decide cases on the broadest grounds possible." Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138,
3154 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
74 Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion but also filed a separate concur-
rence. 104 S. Ct. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 2592.
76 Justice O'Connor wrote that "a court may use its. . . power to modify a consent
decree, only to prevent future violations and to compensate identified victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination." Id. at 2593.
77 Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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B. The Factual Setting: Affirmative Action Consent Decrees in
Conflict with Bona Fide Seniority Systems
1. The Burden of Proof
The constitutional standard regarding the burden of proof im-
posed on a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action is
stricter than the standard imposed by title VII. The fifth and four-
teenth amendments require a plaintiff alleging employment discrim-
ination to prove that his employer intentionally or purposefully
discriminated on account of race.78 Under this standard, a practice
is not unconstitutional "solely because it has a racially disproportion-
ate impact. ' ' 79 Title VII, however, imposes a lower burden of proof
on an employment discrimination plaintiff, requiring only that a liti-
gant prove that an employer's policies produced discriminatory ef-
fects on a minority group. In enacting title VII, "Congress provided
that when hiring and promotion practices. . . are challenged, dis-
criminatory purpose need not be proved ... ."80 Thus, for a court
to impose remedies under title VII, 81 a plaintiff can prove either in-
tentional discrimination or practices that have discriminatory effects
on a minority group.8 2
An exception to title VII's broad prohibition of employment
practices having discriminatory effects is the act's protection of bona
fide seniority systems.83 A bona fide seniority system is one adopted
78 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-45 (1976). See also H. ANDERSON & M.
LEVIN-EPSTEIN, PRIMER OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 76 (2d ed. 1982).
79 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original).
80 Id. at 246-47. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), the Court discussed the broad coverage of title VII pursuant to Congressional
intent:
Congress "proscribe[d not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Thus, the Court
has repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be estab-
lished by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent
but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular group.
Id. at 349 (citations omitted); see also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
64 (1982) (Court reaffirmed broad scope of title VII's protections against discriminatory
effects).
81 Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enumerates the remedies available
in title VII litigation:
[The court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appro-
priate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
82 Both American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 64 (1982) and Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) confirm that title
VII prohibits disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination.
83 Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ap-
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without intent to discriminate.8 4 As the Stotts Court asserted, sec-
tion 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits the application of
a seniority system that has discriminatory effects when the discrimi-
nation is not intentional.85 As a result, when a title VII plaintiff chal-
lenges a seniority system, he has an increased burden of proof.
2. The Special Circumstances of the Stotts Modification: Interference
with a Bona Fide Seniority System
The Court's holding in Stotts86 will have a limited impact on vol-
untary affirmative action programs because of the special circum-
stances surrounding the modification of the Stotts consent decree.
The lower court's alteration of the instrument disturbed the imple-
mentation of an existing bona fide seniority system.87 Thus, Stotts
may only restrict a court's power to interpret and modify a consent
decree when the result would adversely affect a bona fide seniority
system.88
In support of this position, the Ninth Circuit recently asserted
that Stotts "simply holds that a court may not modify a pre-existing
race-conscious consent decree in such a fashion . . . [as to] divest
. . . employees of entitlements under a bona fide seniority sys-
ply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system ... provided that such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) (emphasis added).
84 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation and protection of bona
fide seniority systems, see H. ANDERSON & M. LEVIN-EPsTEIN, supra note 78, at 80-82;
Comment, Employment Discrimination-Seniority Systems Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 357
(1984); Note, Employment Discrimination-American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson: Section
703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ,Extends a "Measure of Immunity" to Seniority Systems
Adopted After the Enactment of Title VII, 58 TUL. L. REV. 386 (1983); Note, Bona Fide Seniority
Systems: Guidelines for the Use of Disparate Impact in the Teamsters Analysis, 31 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 886 (1984); Note, American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson: A Pre-Griggs Approach to
Seniority Systems Under Title VII, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 831 (1984).
85 104 S. Ct. at 2587 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 352 (1977)).
86 See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
87 104 S. Ct. at 2585.
88 Justice Blackmun, concurring in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 215 (1979), explained that in interpreting title VII, the Court has traditionally lim-
ited the weight given certain legislative history documents (including the Senate memo
cited by the Stotts majority, 104 S. Ct. at 2589). This restriction on the weight of the
legislative history includes limiting the scope of the documents "to the protection of
established seniority systems." 443 U.S. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Similarly, "[a]Ithough Stotts says that Title VII protects bona fide seniority plans, the
extent to which the decision will apply when a seniority system is not in question has not
yet been determined." 2 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) 1195 (1984) (citing speech by
William H. Brown, former chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, at the Seventh Annual Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity).
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tem.'89 In either an original title VII litigation or in an action con-
cerning interpretation or modification of a consent decree, a court
acting in accordance with Stotts may order broad, race-conscious,
employment procedures when a bona fide seniority system is not
implicated. 90 As a result, the decision will have minimal impact on
title VII and on court authority under the act.
C. Untouched Relief: Flexibility in Fashioning Voluntary
Affirmative Action Consent Decrees
Although the Stotts Court stated that a court cannot modify a
consent decree to grant retroactive seniority unless the plaintiff is a
proven victim of a discriminatory practice, 9' the decision does not
restrict the relief that parties to a consent decree can privately fash-
ion. Employers and minority employees are often willing to negoti-
ate voluntary affirmative action consent decrees in order to avoid
litigation.92 Although the Court in Stotts maintained that there
might be differences between what employers in the public and pri-
vate sectors can consent to, it did not impose any limitations on the
powers of either.93
The Stotts decision neither expressly nor impliedly restricts what
a private employer can include in a consent decree or a voluntary
affirmative action program. The majority in no way qualified its de-
89 Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1360 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985).
90 This view is further supported by the dissenting opinion ofJustice White, author
of the Stotts opinion, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). In that dissentJustice White
clearly implied that title VII's remedies are broad and that one need not be an actual
victim in order to be protected by the act:
Since any discrimination in employment based upon sexual or racial char-
acteristics aggrieves an employee or an applicant for employment having
such characteristics by stigmatization and explicit or implicit application
of a badge of inferiority, Congress gave such persons standing by statute
to continue an attack upon such discrimination even though they fail to estab-
lish particular injury to themselves in being denied employment unlawfully.
Id. at 413 n.1 (emphasis added).
91 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
92 See supra notes 2-3.
93 In Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 658 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 976 (1982), the court upheld a private employer's affirmative action plan, not-
ing that "[s]eniority is merely an economic right which the unions may elect to bargain
away."
The Stotts Court stated that "[w]hether the city, a public employer, could have [in-
cluded retroactive seniority in the consent decree] without violating the law is an issue
we need not decide." 104 S. Ct. at 2590. This statement implies that a private employer
is not restricted in what he may include in a consent decree.
For an argument that private employers can validly construct voluntary affirmative
action programs with seniority system overrides, see Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action in
the Private Sector-Are Seniority Overrides for Layoffs Permissible?, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 379
(1983). For a survey of judicial review of voluntary affirmative action programs, see
Jacobs, Justice Out of Balance: Voluntary Race-Conscious Affirmative Action in State and Local
Governments, 17 URB. LAw. 1 (1985).
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cision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,94 where it upheld a
private employer's right to fashion an affirmative action plan despite
the reverse discrimination claims of non-minority workers.9 5 The
Court held that when an affirmative action plan is designed "to
break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" and
"does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employ-
ees," it is permissible.96 The Weber Court decided that an em-
ployer's agreement with the union to reserve fifty percent of the
spaces of an in-house training program for black employees "falls
within the area of discretion left by title VII to the private sector
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate
conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories." 97
Indeed, lower courts have relied on Weber to uphold an em-
ployer's right to include retroactive seniority in a voluntary affirma-
tive action consent decree. For example, in Tangren v. Wackenhut
Services,98 the Ninth Circuit upheld the legality of a seniority system
override included in a voluntary affirmative action program negoti-
ated between the employer and the union. The court asserted that
"seniority rights are not vested property rights and. . . can be al-
tered to the detriment of any employees or group of employees by a
good faith agreement between the company and the union." 99 This
concept of seniority rights is consistent with the traditional reluc-
tance of courts to discourage voluntary affirmative action plans.
Thus, courts place a heavy burden on plaintiffs who claim reverse
discrimination.100
The legislative and.case history of title VII indicates that the
Weber standard for examining voluntary affirmative action plans is
"applicable to public employers as well as private employers." 10' In
94 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158
(1984) (Stotts does not overrule Weber), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) .
95 Commentators view Weber as a broad endorsement of voluntary affirmative ac-
tion. Indeed, "[a]ffirmative action as endorsed in Weber ... does not depend on a find-
ing of discrimination. Rather, it is regarded as a way to eliminate racial and sexual
imbalances in employment without regard to how the imbalances came about." 2 EM-
PLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) 1209 (1984).
Although "the apparent scope of the Stotts decision has raised some question as to
whether the Supreme Court would cut back on the approval of voluntary affirmative
action plans that it gave in ... Weber ... [,] Stotts does not even mention Weber. Fur-
thermore, the Court consistently refers in Stotts to what a court can do." Id.
96 443 U.S. at 208.
97 Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
98 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
99 Id. at 707.
100 See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscRIM-
INATION LAw 854 (1983).
101 B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 100, at 840.
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extending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to public employers in its
1972 amendments, 10 2 "Congress indicated its general intent that
the same title VII principles be applied to public and private em-
ployers alike."' 1 3 Consistent with this congressional intent, circuit
courts have applied the liberal Weber standard to all voluntary affirm-
ative action plans. 10 4
The Stotts Court, however, left open the question of whether a
public employer can agree to retroactive seniority in a consent de-
cree.10 5 Nevertheless, the language and reasoning of the deci-
sion 106 and the subsequent case law10 7 indicate that a public
employer has this power.'0 8 The Court based its interpretation of
the consent decree on the finding that the City of Memphis did not
intend to grant retroactive seniority.' 0 9 Thus, the Court did not
need to address the question of whether the city had a right to agree
to such a plan. 110 If the Court had seriously doubted the city's right
to grant this type of award, it is reasonable to assume that it would
have noted such a reservation, rather than leaving the question
open. This conclusion is especially justified in light of the Court's
willingness to set forth dicta potentially restraining the scope of title
VII's protections."' Furthermore, by questioning whether the city
had exercised this power, the Court implicitly assumed that the city
had the power to agree to such a plan.
Lower courts have interpreted Stotts as allowing a public em-
ployer to award retroactive seniority. For example, Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education"12 a post-Stotts Sixth Circuit case, supports the
contention that a public employer may consent to such an award. In
Wygant theJackson Teachers Association and the local Board of Ed-
ucation negotiated a provision in their collective bargaining contract
modifying the city's seniority system to protect newly hired minori-
102 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(1), 6 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982)).
103 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 100, at 840; see also Dorthard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 331-32 n.14 (1977).
104 See, e.g., Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 507-08 (8th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police
Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 (6th Cir. 1979).
105 See supra note 93.
106 See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
108 Nonetheless, officials in the Department ofJustice maintain that public employ-
ers may not, consistent with the Constitution, voluntarily grant preferential treatment to
minorities. Pear, supra note 13, at 1, col. 5.
109 "Had there been any intention to depart from the seniority plan in the event of
layoffs. . . it is much more reasonable to believe that there would have been an express
provision to that effect." 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
110 See supra note 93.
111 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
112 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
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ties in the event of layoffs." 13 The court held that it was "within the
power and authority of the parties" to provide such special protec-
tions for the minority employees.1 14 Although the court recognized
that Stotts left this question open, it concluded, "[w]e do not read
Stotts as barring this form of affirmative action." 115 The Sixth Cir-
cuit recently reaffirmed this notion that neither title VII nor Stotts
restricts the relief to which a public employer can voluntarily
agree;116 the court asserted that title VII's protection of seniority
systems and its limitations on judicial powers merely "provide a
shield to an employer in defending a title VII action, not a sword to
[a non-minority] employee claiming" title VII violations. 1 7 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Western Electric, Inc.,118 a non-title VII post-
Stotts case involving the interpretation of a consent decree, the dis-
trict court asserted that the Stotts Court clearly implied "that if the
parties had [intended to grant retroactive seniority], the Court
would have construed the decree in accordance therewith." 119
113 Id. at 1154. The contract provided:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most
seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a
greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minor-
ity personnel employed at the time of the layoff.
Id. (emphasis added by court).
114 Id. at 1157.
115 Id. at 1158. See also Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. NewJersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 588
F. Supp. 732 (D.NJ. 1984). In Vulcan the district court upheld a seniority system against
a Stotts-like affirmative action consent decree, but asserted that the parties should reach
an equitable agreement:
The Supreme Court opinion prohibits a court from preferring minority
rights over seniority rights. It does not, however, prohibit the parties
themselves from reaching an accomodation of those rights. There need
not be a choice between the two, unless those involved are unwilling to
recognize the rights and legitimate claims and viewpoints of the other.
Id. at 734. The Vulcan court also declared that Stotts's "declaration that minority rights
cannot supplant seniority rights is not the end of the matter, but rather the beginning."
Id. at 735. The court then directed the parties to "develop an agreement regarding
layoffs not inconsistent with the Supreme Court ruling in Stotts." Id
116 Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 486-87 (6th Cir.
1985).
117 Id. at 486.
118 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
119 Id. at 858 n.41.
The ideological positions of the Justices also support the proposition that public
employers can agree to retroactive seniority. It appears that a majority of the Stotts
Court was willing to uphold a consent decree in which a public employer explicitly
grants retroactive seniority as part of an affirmative action settlement. The three dis-
senters,Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, by virtue of their positions regarding
the outcome of the case, would have almost certainly held that the city has such power.
Similarly, Justice Stevens indicated his respect for a consent decree awarding retroactive
seniority, explaining that "[i]f the District Court. . .was merely enforcing the terms of
the consent decree it was interpreting," he would have affirmed the ruling. 104 S. Ct. at
2595 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also indicated that the district court's
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Even if an award of constructive seniority were not included in a
consent decree, future parties can specify individual "victims" of
discrimination in the instrument. A court subsequently enforcing
that consent decree would comply with Stotts by modifying the docu-
ment to grant competitive seniority in order to protect minorities
against layoffs. 120 Although identifying individuals is a politically
sensitive endeavor, it might be a desirable alternative for an em-
ployer who is reluctant to grant the controversial constructive sen-
iority award. The Stotts majority suggested this option when it
implied that the modification would have been valid "had the parties
in formulating the consent decree purported to identify any specific
employee entitled to particular relief."12 1 Further, the Supreme
Court indicated that, under §§ 1981122 and 1983,123 an admission of
intentional discrimination would also be sufficient for remedial ac-
tion, including the granting of constructive seniority by a court.1 24
D. The Legal Context: Effects on Title VII Cases
The Court's holding in Stotts is further limited because it in-
volves only title VII and not the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, 125 an alternate route for minorities claiming job
discrimination. Expressly stating that "this was Title VII litigation,"
the Court implied that Stotts does not apply outside the title VII con-
preliminary injunction regarding the layoffs would have been justified had it been "a
reasonable interpretation of the consent decree." Id. at 2592 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). She asserted that "in negotiating the consent decree, respondents could have
...possibly obtained. . . retroactive relief." Id. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120 "Courts have held that the requirement for a 'finding' of discrimination could be
satisfied by stipulation in consent decrees or by the terms of conciliation agreements."
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 100, at 858 (footnotes omitted).
121 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
122 Section 1981 provides the following:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
123 Section 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
124 104 S. Ct. at 2590.
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State. . .deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
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text. 126 The Court's reliance on title VII's legislative history pro-
vides additional support for this proposition. 127 Furthermore, the
Court exclusively and explicitly relies on title V11128 in its granting
of protection to seniority systems 129 and in its dicta on the require-
ment that individuals be actual victims of discrimination. 130
Because Stotts implicates only title VII and not the fourteenth
amendment, employment discrimination plaintiffs may avoid the
harshness of the holding in two respects. First, the special protec-
tion for bona fide seniority systems is available under title VII, but
not under the fourteenth amendment. In a post-Stotts equal protec-
tion case, NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association,13 1 after a judicial
finding of intentional discrimination against blacks as a class and the
subsequent imposition of an affirmative action plan, the district
court prohibited the city from laying off blacks because the layoffs
would have "a devastating effect upon the city's affirmative action
plan."' 132 The court justified overriding the city's seniority system,
in light of Stotts, by explaining that "the Fourteenth Amendment
provides no mention of bona fide seniority clauses . . . as a de-
fense."' 133 The court based its decision, in part, on the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Buffalo Teacher's Federation v. Arthur,'34
less than two weeks after Stotts. In Buffalo Teacher's Association the dis-
trict court found that the local board of education had violated the
fourteenth amendment by intentionally causing the racial segrega-
tion of faculty and administrative staffs in the public schools.135 The
district court later ordered a detailed remedial plan to achieve a ra-
126 104 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9.
127 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
128 Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
129 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
130 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
131 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
132 Id at 1200.
133 Id at 1201. The court continued:
Stotts involved Title VII. This case involves liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Title VII contains a clause specifically exempting bona fide
seniority systems from attack. The Fourteenth Amendment contains no
such restrictions. Stotts and the Title VII cases relied upon by the
Supreme Court there rest on interpretations of Congressional intent in
enacting Title VII, and contain no interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 1202 (footnotes omitted). "[T]his Court will not write 'bona fide seniority system'
into the U.S. Constitution, as the city invites it to do." Id at 1203 n. 11.
134 104 S. Ct. at 3555 (1984). Although the court admitted that "[i]n general, no
precedential effect should be given to a denial of certiorari," it nevertheless contended
that the denial indicated that "Stotts presents no authority for changing this Court's de-
termination of liability against the City of Detroit." NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers'
Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. at 1203.
135 Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), a ff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Manch v. Arthur, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
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cial balance in the Buffalo school system. 136 Although it set aside
part of the plan as overly harsh, the Second Circuit held that judicial
relief that infringes upon a seniority system is permissible, regard-
less of whether the system is bona fide, to rectify a violation of the
equal protection clause. 137
The Stotts Court's dicta asserting that one must be an actual vic-
tim also applies solely to title VII. In discussing whether a plaintiff
must be an actual victim before a court may grant relief, the Stotts
Court relied exclusively on the legislative history of title VII.l3s
Under the fourteenth amendment, a litigant need not be an actual
victim of discrimination in order to receive preferential treatment;
rather, courts will grant relief on a class-wide basis. In Fullilove v.
Klutznick' 3 9 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Congres-
sional enactment requiring that ten percent of federal funds for
work projects go to minority businesses; the act did not require any
of the benefitted businesses to prove that they had been victims of
discrimination. Lower courts have also permitted relief under the
fourteenth amendment without requiring that the claimants be ac-
tual victims of discrimination. In NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Asso-
ciation,140 the court noted that "[i]t is well established by now that
race-conscious remedies are permitted to redress constitutional vio-
lations."' 14 1 As such, "[c]lass-wide relief . . . is . ..permissible
without the individual members of the class having to prove that
they were actual victims of past discrimination."' 142 Similarly, in
Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 143 a dissenting D.C. circuit judge asserted that
Fullilove supports the contention that "courts clearly have the power
to order race-conscious remedies [including quotas] for proven con-
stitutional violations."' 144 Therefore, the fourteenth amendment
does not require an employment discrimination plaintiff to be an
136 Arthur v. Nyquist, 520 F. Supp. 961, 966-67 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), afdin part, rev'din
part, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Buffalo Teachers' Fed'n v. Arthur,
104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984).
137 Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816, 822, cert. denied sub nom. Buffalo Teachers'
Fed'n v. Arthur, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984).
138 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
139 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971) (district court's use of racial quotas for school desegregation per-
missible because of prior constitutional finding of discrimination in segregation of
schools); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 100, at 1398, (Supreme Court decision in
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 430 U.S. 265 (1978), "indicate[s] that at least five
Justices [Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun] accept the power of a court
to set quotas benefitting persons other than identifiable victims of discrimination in or-
der to correct past discrimination.") (footnote omitted).
140 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984); see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141 591 F. Supp. at 1207 (citations omitted).
142 Id
143 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
144 Id. at 1397 (Wald, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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actual victim of discrimination in order to receive preferential treat-
ment by a court.145
Because Stotts is exclusively a title VII case, the decision does
not affect actions brought under the equal protection clause. A liti-
gant under the fourteenth amendment need not meet the Stotts bur-
dens regarding either seniority system overrides or proof that he
has actually been victimized by the illegal discrimination. Even
though the constitutional standard is more onerous than title VII in
requiring proof of intentional discrimination, 146 minorities claiming
intentional employment discrimination can use the equal protection
clause to redress grievances and avoid any Stotts restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts sets forth dicta indicat-
ing a conservative attitude in the interpretation of title VII. None-
theless, the Supreme Court's actual holding is narrow, merely
defining a court's power to interpret and modify voluntary affirma-
tive action consent decrees. Moreover, the Stotts holding can be ad-
ditionally confined to the facts of the case-the judicial modification
of a consent decree where an affirmative action plan conflicts with a
bona fide seniority system. Future employment discrimination liti-
gants can also circumvent Stotts by carefully drafting consent decrees
to account for possible layoffs. In addition, alternate judicial routes
for employment discrimination litigants remain untouched by the
Stotts dicta. Thus, in Stotts the Supreme Court simply sounded a
false alarm by shouting Firefighters in a crowded workplace..
David Keith Fram
145 See also Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir.
1984) (asserting that Supreme Court recognizes fourteenth amendment as serving a
"race conscious and remedial function").
146 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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